Notes on What Is Populism?

Jan-Werner Müller defines populism as: a political movement that claims to speak for the entire "people"— at least, the often-vague "real people"— at the exclusion of some members of the populace, such as "elites" or immigrants. He argues that populists rely on a constant enemy; for Hugo Chavez this was the United States, for Viktor Orbán it was the E.U. or those who didn't match his Christian nationalist definition of what Hungary should be. Populists claim that the real will of the people is being ignored or subverted by these enemies. They often use dichotomies such as contrasting "the real Americans" or "true patriots" with some other group of people. Populists claim a moral authority to speak for the "true people," a homogeneous group whose will can never be wrong. Since the "real people" is a symbolic construct— not empirically defined, such as via ballots— populists can always claim that the people are being disenfranchised: losing an election is due to mass fraud or corruption, rather than simply not having enough popular support. Populists also often seek to validate themselves through performative gestures such as low-turnout referenda designed to simply legitimize the party's preexisting goals. Müller argues that populism is exclusive, in that there's a common enemy who does not represent the people (and eventually should be disenfranchised). Being anti-elite does not make someone a populist; she must also be anti-pluralist in the sense of claiming that anyone outside the party cannot or does not represent the popular will.

Okay, we have an idea of what populism is. But why is it so bad? One of Müller's key points is that populists' goal is to reach and then remain in power, through distortion of the political system if necessary, and they justify this distortion by their claim to sole moral authority over the popular will: no one else can speak for the people, so why should they be allowed in government? Despite claims by some that populism is inherently oppositional and thus cannot hold force once in government (at which point the populists have become by definition the "establishment"), Müller gives examples such as Hugo Chavez who, while in control of the Venezuelan government, constantly railed against the United States for its supposed work in countering Venezuela's goals and desires. He points out cases where populists have used the government to entrench themselves in power, via channels like drawing up new constitutions that advantage their party or exclude others. They often wield the legal system as a cudgel to beat their enemies, while bending the rules to help their friends ("discriminatory legalism"). Additionally, Müller draws a trajectory from populist opposition to mass clientelism— as a means for maintaining the support of the party's base once in power— corruption, and power consolidation such as silencing critical media and limiting the role of the judiciary. These symptoms, and the fomenting of societal distrust in such institutions, are harmful to democracy and likely to lead to serious constitutional conflict.

How does one counter populism? Müller argues against simple exclusion of populist actors from the political process. He says that one can "talk to populists without talking like them." He states that support for populism often comes from those who feel that the existing democratic system has failed them. Müller cautions against patronizing explanations of populist supporters and instead recommends identifying and addressing the failures in the system that have left these people feeling as if populism is their best bet for true (as opposed to nominal) political representation. Interestingly, he points out Bernie Sanders as an example of someone who is often referred to as a populist but who does not match Müller's definition (i.e. Bernie is anti-elite but does not seek to exclude some group from political representation nor claim to command America's "popular will").